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Abstract
The debate surrounding fiduciary duties owed to creditors by directors, especially in the vicinity
of insolvency, has resurfaced in light of two court decisions in Canada and the United States. In
this paper, we contribute to the discussion by looking at the issue from a corporate finance
perspective, where we utilize well-established theorems and results. We show that creditors are
able to protect themselves by the use of covenants. While this idea has been reported extensively
in previous discussions about fiduciary duties, we focus on studies that show the extent to which
creditors use covenants to protect themselves against opportunistic behavior by managers and
shareholders. Additionally, we show that debt can actually increase the value of the firm and the
shares, and therefore, the idea that shareholders use debt for opportunistic behavior is misplaced.
If anything, debt is used to align managerial incentives to maximize the value of the firm. The
Fisher Separation theorem is also introduced and used to show that all stakeholders in a firm will
want the firm to pursue projects with the maximum net present value. Hence, we propose that
fiduciary duties should always be owed to the corporation as a whole, where the main focus of
the managers is investing in those projects that have the highest expected net present value.
1.

Introduction

When a firm is on the verge of bankruptcy and the cash is almost all gone, the directors
of the firm may be tempted to gamble the cash on a very risky venture in the hopes of striking it
rich. After all, like the characters played by Demi Moore and Woody Harrelson in Indecent
Proposal, when you are down on your luck, going for broke seems like a good option. If you
win, you win big (just as in the movie), but if you lose, you were going to anyway. The directors
of a paving company that was about to go bankrupt, in fact, did just that when they withdrew the
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remaining cash from the company’s bank account and gambled it all in Las Vegas.1 They were
not as fortunate as Demi Moore or Woody Harrelson (and probably not as good looking), and
they were ordered to repay the cash to the creditors. From this extreme scenario, many courts
and commentators have expressed concerns that when corporations are the in the vicinity of
insolvency, the directors may be tempted to engage in very risky business ventures that put the
creditors’ assets at risk while fulfilling the shareholders’ desire for the one last hurrah.2
Several cases in the United States and Canada have sparked a heated debate regarding the
fiduciary duties of directors to creditors, especially in the “vicinity of insolvency.”3 The courts’
language fuelled a storm of controversy among academics and practitioners alike.4 The concern
regarding directors and creditors is sometimes summarized as follows: since shareholders elect
directors, the directors are beholden to the shareholders; when the firm is in the vicinity of
insolvency, the shareholders will prefer that directors engage in risky projects that have a large
upside potential much to the chagrin of creditors who would rather the directors engage in less
risky activities so that they may recover some of their principal. Hence, the courts have
expressed concern that directors may sometimes gamble away creditors’ money.5
In this paper, we argue that that the proper scope of fiduciary duties is the maximization
of the firm’s value, regardless of the potential conflicts between shareholders and creditors.6

1

In re Tri State Paving, Inc., 32 B.R. 2 (Bankr., W.D. Penn. 1982). This example was cited in the third edition of
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND
PROBLEMS 632 (1996).
2
See infra note 32 and the accompanying text.
3
Credit Lyonnais Bank N.V. v. Pathé Communications Corp, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991); People's
Department Stores Ltd. (1992) Inc., Re, 23 C.B.R. (4th) 200, [1999] R.R.A. 178, J.E. 99-318, REJB 1998-09776
(C.S. Que. Dec 15, 1998).
4
See infra note 34 and note 47 and the accompanying text.
5
See infra note 32 and the accompanying comments.
6
This paper analyzes only the principal positive obligation imposed on directors by fiduciary duties, namely the
obligation to act in the best interests of the corporation. In addition to the obligation to maximize the value of the
firm, the obligation to act in the best interests of the corporation imposes on directors a set of negative obligations as
well. The directors have the obligation not to compete with the corporation, not to engage in self-dealing, the
obligation to avoid conflicts of interests, not to usurp the firm’s opportunities and the obligation not to disclose
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In order to reach the maximization goal, the directors must undertake the projects that
have the highest expected net present value (“NPV”). The insolvency zone, we argue, should not
affect the purpose of fiduciary duties and the expectations of corporate constituencies. As a firm
nears insolvency, the maximization of the firm’s value will continue to serve stakeholders’
interests.
Furthermore, we demonstrate that the alleged tension between shareholders and creditors
is irrelevant for the purpose of maximizing the firm’s value. We base our conclusion on two
main corporate finance concepts: the Modigliani-Miller theorem and its progeny, and the Fisher
Separation. We utilize the Modigliani-Miller theorem and its progeny to demonstrate that,
insofar as there is an optimal debt level, the value of the firm is independent of the financing
decision.7 We also invoke the Fisher Separation theorem, which states that the productive and
market transactions a firm engages in are independent of the shareholders’ (and creditors’)
preferences for risk. What the firm must do, the theorem will tell us, is to choose projects that
have the highest expected net present value (“NPV”).
Additionally, we demonstrate that maximizing the value of the firm effectively serves the
interests of all corporate constituencies. Serving the interests of various stakeholders becomes
the effect and not the focus of the fiduciary duties.

confidential information (See e.g EDWARD WELCH & ANDREW TUREZYN, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW: FUNDAMENTALS 83-97 (1998); PAUL D. FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS (1977); KEVIN
PATRICK MCGUINESS, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF CANADIAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 712-764 (1999). These
restrictions imposed on directors by fiduciary duties, which are far less controversial, exceed the purpose of our
analysis. Some authors argue that fiduciary duties are composed only of negative obligations. Ribstein & Alces
claim that the fiduciary duty “is merely one not to act selfishly or to engage in the sort of egregiously nonmaximizing conduct that is caught by the business judgment rule.” See Larry E. Ribstein & Kelli Alces, Directors’
Duties in Failing Firms, forthcoming J. BUS. TECH. L. (2006) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =880074.
Moreover, these authors argue that “[f]iduciary duties do not tell directors what they ‘should’ or ‘should not’ do, but
define the limits on judicial action based on director conduct.” Id). We believe that there is more to fiduciary duties
than restrictions. Directors have the positive obligation to promote the best interests of the corporation, as several
court decisions held (see supra, Section 2).
7
See infra note 85 and the text associated with this note.
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Our paper is not meant to rebut the shareholder primacy8 or even the board of directors
primacy9 theories advanced by many commentators; rather it is meant to shift the focal point of
the discussion from stakeholders to the corporation and, in the process, to resolve much of the
concerns that have plagued those who advocate that directors may owe fiduciary duties directly
to creditors or to shareholders.
The paper will proceed as follows: In Section 2, we briefly present the current status of
the legal doctrine and jurisprudence pertaining to directors’ fiduciary duties. We conclude that
there is a widespread confusion between the intrinsic interests of the corporation and the specific
interests of its constituencies. In Section 3 we argue that directors’ fiduciary duty to act in the
best interests of the corporation require them to maximize the value of the firm, by selecting the
highest net present value projects. In the following section we use the Modigliani-Miller theorem
and the Fisher Separation theorem to demonstrate that the goal of firm value maximization is
largely independent of the conflicts between creditors’ and shareholders’ interests in the
corporation. We thus illustrate that the corporation has a distinct economic interest that can be
furthered by directors without investigating stakeholders’ particular expectations. In Section 5
we show that maximizing the value of the firm effectively meets the economic interests of
corporate constituencies and, therefore, aligns such interests with those of the firm itself.

2.

Directors and Stakeholders in and out of Insolvency: A review of Doctrine and
Jurisprudence

8

See infra note 52 and the text associated with this note.
See e.g. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L.
Rev. 547 (2002-2003); Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006).
9
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The discussion about the duties of directors in the vicinity of insolvency has its roots in
the various competing theories that undergird the concept of the corporation. These theories have
their origins in a debate that started in the 1930s between Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd. On
the one end, Berle, argued that the corporation existed only to make money for its shareholders,10
while Dodd claimed that the firm has responsibilities towards all its constituencies, not just
shareholders.11
The Berle-Dodd debate had a material influence over theories on the scope of directors’
fiduciary duties. The significance of determining the scope and the recipient of the fiduciary
duties was presciently emphasized by Justice Frankfurter:
[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins the analysis; it gives direction to further
inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In
what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations?12
On one hand, if the corporation exists for shareholders only, then the directors owe their
duties to the shareholders regardless of the insolvency status. On the other hand, if the
corporation should serve a broader range of interests, then directors need to be cognizant of these
interests and take great care in serving them (especially when the firm approaches insolvency).
Very often, the theories examining the purpose of fiduciary duties either fail to
acknowledge a distinct, intrinsic economic interest of the corporate entity, or they intermingle
such interest with those of the stakeholders. One of the most recent Delaware cases tackling the

10

Adolph A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (stating that “all
powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation … are
at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears”); For Whom
Corporate Managers Are Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1933) (arguing that the shareholders’ wealth
maximization norm cannot be abandoned until there is a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities
towards other constituencies).
11
Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932) (advocating
“a view of the business corporation as an economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit making
function”).
12
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp. 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1942).
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matter of directors’ fiduciary duties is an eloquent example. In Production Resources,13 the
Delaware Court of Chancery argued that, even in insolvency, the corporation itself remains the
recipient of fiduciary duties. Vice Chancellor Strine pointed out:
… even in the case of an insolvent firm, poor decisions by directors that lead to a loss of
corporate assets and are alleged to be a breaches [sic] of equitable fiduciary duties remain harms
to the corporate entity itself.14 (emphasis added)

According to Vice Chancellor Strine’s judgment, the only significant shift that occurs in
insolvency is the constituency that stands to loose the most in case of breach of fiduciary duties.
In financially distressed firms, creditors become the residual claimants. Consequently, directors
have the obligation to maximize the value of the firm “on behalf” of the creditors.15
Although the reasoning of this decision is based on the premise that the corporation is the
beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary duties regardless of its solvency, Vice Chancellor Strine failed
to distinguish between the interests of the corporation itself and the particular interests of
corporate constituencies. He used interchangeably the concepts of fiduciary duties owed to the
corporation itself and fiduciary duties owed to the residual risk-bearers (shareholders, when the
corporation is solvent, and creditors in insolvency), thus adding to the confusion surrounding the

13

Production Resources v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772 (Del.Ch. 2004). In this case, Production Resources Group
(“PRG”) brought a claim against its debtor, NCT Group, alleging breach of fiduciary duty by NCT’s board, and
requesting the appointment of a receiver. PRG invoked NCT’s insolvency to argue that it may bring such claims
directly (and not derivatively). NCT moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. The Court ruled that PRG’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty based on “gross negligence or
worse” represent claims for breach of duty of care and fall under the exculpatory provisions of NCT’ charter.
Therefore, the Court held that, in this respect, PRG failed to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. However, the
amount of the compensations received by NCT’s managers and the unusual set of particularized facts were deemed
sufficient grounds for a non-exculpated breach of fiduciary duty claim. Therefore, the motion to dismiss PRG’s
claim for breach of fiduciary duty was granted to the limited extent mentioned above, and was denied in any other
respect.
14
Id. at 792.
15
Id. at 791.
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matter of directors’ duties.16 For example, at the beginning of his analysis of fiduciary duties,
Vice Chancellor Strine acknowledged that
[O]ur corporate law (and that of most of our nation) expects that the directors of a solvent firm
will cause the firm to undertake economic activities that maximize the value of the firm’s cash
flows primarily for the benefit of the residual risk-bearers, the owners of the firm's equity
capital.17 (emphasis added)

Yet later, he wrote:
When a firm has reached the point of insolvency, it is settled that under Delaware law, the firm’s
directors are said to owe fiduciary duties to the company’s creditors. This is an uncontroversial
proposition... The directors continue to have the task of attempting to maximize the economic
value of the firm. That much of their job does not change. But the fact of insolvency does
necessarily affect the constituency on whose behalf the directors are pursuing that end. By
definition, the fact of insolvency places the creditors in the shoes normally occupied by the
shareholders — that of residual risk-bearers.18 (emphasis added)

In insolvency, he further explained, the creditors acquire the right to sue the directors
derivatively, on behalf of the corporation. Insolvency does not make creditors direct beneficiaries
of fiduciary duties and, therefore, creditors cannot bring a direct claim against corporate
managers, for breach of fiduciary duties. Such claims “…remain derivative, with either
shareholders or creditors suing to recover for a harm done to the corporation as an economic
entity”19. The recovery pursuant to such claim “benefits the derivative plaintiffs indirectly to the
extent of their claim on the firm’s assets.”20
16

The failure to emphasize that directors’ duties run at all times to the corporation (regardless of what particular
constituency indirectly benefits the most) renders this decision dangerously ambiguous. Campbell & Frost’s analysis
of Production Resources is a good example to illustrate the potential for confusion or misinterpretation created by
this decision. These authors claim that “the duty of corporate managers in the vicinity of insolvency, as Vice
Chancellor Strine sees it, continues to be an obligation to act in the best interests of shareholders, subject, however,
to an expanded right (but no obligation) to transfer wealth from shareholders to creditors. Vice Chancellor Strine’s
fundamental point – that moving from solvency to the vicinity or zone of insolvency should not change managers’
basic fiduciary obligation to act in the best interests of shareholders – is in our view sound.” Rutherford B.
Campbell, Jr. & Cristopher W. Frost, Managers’ Fiduciary Duties in Financially Distressed Corporations: Chaos in
Delaware (and Elsewhere), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=900904, 19-20 (2006) (emphasis added).
17
Production Resources v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772, 787 (Del.Ch. 2004).
18
Id. at 792.
19
Id. at 792.
20
Id.
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So far, it appears that the underlying principle to emerge from Vice Chancellor Strine’s
judgment is that the corporation, as a distinct entity, is the direct beneficiary of fiduciary duties,
regardless of which constituency reaps most of the benefits generated by such duties. In light of
this theory, Vice Chancellor’s ruling in Production Resources is surprising. After arguing that,
in insolvency, the corporation remains the beneficiary of fiduciary duties and, therefore, creditors
can sue directors only derivatively, Vice Chancellor Strine concluded:
I will resolve the motion on the established principle that when a firm is insolvent, the directors
take on a fiduciary relationship to the company’s creditors, combining that principle with the
conservative assumption that there might, possibly exist circumstances in which the directors
display such a marked degree of animus towards a particular creditor with a proven entitlement to
payment that they expose themselves to a direct fiduciary duty claim by that creditor.21 (emphasis
added)

Later, he added:
…I am not prepared to rule out the possibility that [the creditor] can prove that the [debtor’s]
board has engaged in conduct towards [the creditor] that might support a direct claim for breach
of fiduciary duty by it as a particular creditor.22

The decision in Production Resources appears to endorse the theory that, in insolvency,
situations may occur, in which creditors could have direct claims against directors for breach of
fiduciary duties.23 The theory advocating fiduciary duties for the benefit of creditors, as the firm
becomes insolvent, had already received both doctrinal24 and jurisprudential25 endorsements

21

Id. at 798 (emphasis added).
Id. at 800.
23
The contradictory language of Production Resources has generated various interpretations of Vice Chancellor
Strine’s judgment. Some authors interpreted this decision as simply reinforcing the derivative character of creditors’
claims against the directors (Ribstein & Alces, supra note 6 at 13). The business judgment rule continues to protect
directors’ decisions in the proximity of insolvency (Id.).
24
The theory that advocates direct fiduciary duties to creditors was grounded on the trust fund doctrine. According
to this doctrine, the directors of insolvent companies are regarded as constructive trustees for the benefit of creditors.
Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 45 (1998-1999). De R. Barondes claims that “[t]he majority rule, and the law in Delaware, is that, upon
insolvency, a board’s duties are owed to the creditors of the enterprise” (Id. at 63). He further adds that “the ‘trust
fund’ doctrine is the seminal theory” (Id. at 64).
22
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prior to Production Resources.

For example, in Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications,26 Vice

Chancellor Chandler argued that the insolvency in fact, and not the initiation of bankruptcy
procedures, entitles creditors to become the beneficiaries of directors’ fiduciary duties.
Two factors lead me to conclude that insolvency means insolvency in fact rather than insolvency
due to a statutory filing in defining insolvency for purposes of determining when a fiduciary duty
to creditors arises. The first and more important factor is that Delaware caselaw requires this
conclusion…27 Besides Delaware caselaw, the other factor upon which I rely in holding that the
insolvency exception arises upon the fact of insolvency rather than the institution of statutory
proceedings is the ordinary meaning of the word insolvency. An entity is insolvent when it is
unable to pay its debts as they fall due in the usual course of business… That is, an entity is
insolvent when it has liabilities in excess of a reasonable market value of assets.28 (emphasis
added)

In determining the beneficiary of fiduciary duties in insolvency, Vice Chancellor
Chandler used a use similar approach to that applied by Vice Chancellor Strine in Production
Resources.

He alternated between referring to creditors’ interests and the interests of the

corporation, thereby creating potential for confusion between the two types of interests.
The existence of the fiduciary duties at the moment of insolvency may cause directors to choose a
course of action that best serves the entire corporate enterprise rather than any single group
interested in the corporation at a point in time when shareholders’ wishes should not be the
directors only concern. Furthermore, the existence of the duties at the moment of insolvency
25

See Bovay v. H. M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808, 813 (Del. 1944) (providing that "[t]he fact which creates the
trust [for the benefit of creditors] is the insolvency, and when that fact is established, the trust arises, and the legality
of the acts thereafter performed will be decided by very different principles than in the case of solvency.”); Davis v.
Woolf, 147 F.2d 629 (4th Cir.1945) (providing that “when a corporation becomes insolvent or [is] in a failing
condition, the officers and directors no longer represent the stockholders, but by the fact of insolvency, become
trustees for creditors.”). See also Bank Leumi-Le-Israel, B.M., Philadelphia Branch v. Sunbelt Industries, Inc., 485
F. Supp. 556, 559 (S.D. Ga 1980) (stating that, in the case of an insolvent firm, the directors and officers are trustees
of corporate properties for the primary benefit of creditors); In Re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc., 225 B.R. 646
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998) (stating that creditors replace shareholders as “residual owners” of a corporation during
insolvency); In Re Healthco Intern., Inc., 208 B.R. 288, (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997) (providing that, when a transaction
renders the corporation insolvent, or brings it to the brink of insolvency, the rights of creditors become paramount);
Federal Deposit Ins. v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1982) (providing that “when the corporation
becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the stockholders to the creditors”).
26
621 A.2d 748 (Del. Ch. 1992). In Geyer, Geyer, the plaintiff, was a shareholder and employee of Ingersoll
Publications Company (“IPCO”). Ingersoll was the President, Chairman of the Board and controlling shareholder of
IPCO. IPCO repurchased Geyer’s shares for a price of $2 million, to be paid in increasing amounts. IPCO defaulted
on its payments. Geyer brought the action against IPCO and Ingersoll, alleging, inter alia, breaches of fiduciary
duties. Ingersoll filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and that the
plaintiff failed to state a claim for which the Court can grant relief. The Court denied Ingersoll’s motion to dismiss.
27
Id. at 787.
28
Id. at 789.
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rather than the institution of statutory proceedings prevents creditors from having to prophesy
when directors are entering into transactions that would render the entity insolvent and
improperly prejudice creditors’ interests.29 (emphasis added)

Although the Court’s comments regarding the beneficiary of fiduciary duties are dicta,30
Geyer v. Ingersoll is often invoked as an argument for the claim that, when insolvency in fact
occurs, creditors become the beneficiaries of fiduciary duties.31
Another school of thought believes that the mere threat of insolvency (as opposed to
insolvency in fact or initiation of bankruptcy proceedings) is sufficient for a shift in the
beneficiary of fiduciary duties to occur. As the firm enters the so-called “vicinity of insolvency”,
the shareholders cease to be the main beneficiary of such duties, whereas creditors gain a
preeminent interest in the firm’s business.32 In the “zone of insolvency”, the fiduciary duties
require directors to take into account creditors’ interests as well as the claims of all other
29

Id. at 789.
See supra note 26.
31
See e.g. Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed
Corporation, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1191 (2002-2003).
32
The theory’s rationale is that, when the company approaches insolvency, the shareholders retain no interest in the
firm, whereas the creditors become the true corporate stakeholders. In such circumstances, the firm is effectively
trading with creditors’ money. Moreover, it is argued that insolvency creates for shareholders the incentive to
engage in overly risky projects. Guarded by the limited liability principle, the shareholders have nothing to loose if a
very risky investment goes sour, whereas the creditors bear the entire risk associated with such ventures. See Lynn
M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly
Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 683-684 (1993) (providing that, when a marginally solvent company
engages in high risk investments, the risks are borne primarily by creditors while the benefits accrue primarily to
shareholders); Andrew Keay, The Director’s Duty to Take Into Account the Interests of Company Creditors: When
is it Triggered?, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 315, 317-318 (2001) (noting that, in the vicinity of insolvency, the company is
effectively trading with creditors’ money and, therefore, the creditors may be seen as the major stakeholders in the
firm); Stephen McDonnell, Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co: Insolvency Shifts Directors’ Burden Form
Shareholders to Creditors, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 177, 185 (1994) (arguing that “[t]he rationale of the shift upon
insolvency is that creditors become the equitable owners of the corporation because they are the only parties with an
interest in the corporation’s assets”); Brian Morgan & Harry Underwood, Directors’ Liability to Creditors on a
Corporation’s Insolvency in Light of the Dylex and Peoples Department Stores Litigation, 39 CAN. L. BUS. .J. 336,
338 (2004) (noting that, when a corporation is near insolvency, “it is not contentious to state that the company is
effectively subsisting on funding provided (albeit unwillingly) by its creditors”); Stéphane Rousseau, The Duties of
Directors of Financially Distressed Corporations: A Québec Perspective on the Peoples Case, 39 CAN. L. BUS. J.
368, 382 (2004) (stating that “at the point of insolvency, the shareholders cease to have any material interest in the
assets of the corporation, since there is little or no equity remaining. It is therefore in the interests of shareholders to
keep the corporation in business and to undertake risky investments as there is no downside risk for them, only
upside benefit”). For an opinion claiming that management’s risk preference is not a solid ground to justify the shift
of fiduciary duties from shareholders to creditors see Edward M. Iacobucci, Directors’ Duties in Insolvency:
Clarifying What is at Stake, 39 CAN. BUS. L. J. 398, 407 (2004).
30
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constituencies that contribute to the firm’s wellbeing. Stated differently, on the brink of
insolvency directors must maximize the value of all claims against the firm.33
The seminal case promoting the “vicinity of insolvency” doctrine is Credit Lyonnais
Bank N.V. v. Pathé Communications Corp.34 The decision issued by the Delaware Chancery
Court in Credit Lyonnais marked a fundamental change in the landscape of director liability, by
forcing directors to consider the effects their decisions may have upon non-shareholding
constituencies as the firm becomes financially distressed.35
For all its novelty, Credit Lyonnais addressed the “vicinity of insolvency” concept in a
cursory and ambiguous fashion. Chancellor Allen pointed out that:
At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not
merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.36

Furthermore, he stated that the board of directors “had an obligation to the community of
interest that sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in an informed, good faith effort to
33

See Andrew D. Shaffer, Corporate Fiduciary-Insolvent: The Fiduciary Relationship Your Corporate Law
Professor (Should Have) Warned You About, 8 AM. BANKR. L. REV. 479, 517-520 (2000) (arguing that the
justification for director’s fiduciary duties to creditors in the vicinity of insolvency is based on the contingent
property interest of the creditors and the threat to the “legal value” of their claims); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking
a Corporation’s Obligation to Creditors 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 647, 667 (1996) (noting that “[c]reditors of an
insolvent corporation, however, not only have a senior right to repayment, but they also now have the right,
traditionally associated with ownership, to the “upside” in value of the corporate debtor’s assets, at least until the
corporation regains solvency”); Jacob S. Ziegel, Creditors as Corporate Stakeholders: The Quiet Revolution – An
Anglo-Canadian Perspective, 43 U. TOR. L.J. 511, 529-531 (1993) (claiming that the protection of creditors’
interests by fiduciary duties is justified by the inequality of positions between the corporation and the creditors and
by the necessity to balance the advantages conferred to shareholders by limited liability).
34
1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991). Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland (“CLBN”) was a major lender to MGMPathé Communications Co. (“MGM”) and to MGM's parent, Pathé Communications Corp. (“PCC”). PCC defaulted
on loans from CLBN, which were secured with the shares held by PCC in MGM. Based on a Corporate Governance
Agreement, CLBN claimed to be the registered owner of the MGM controlling block of shares, and replaced PCC’s
directors from MGM’s board. Furthermore, CLBN filed a petition in court seeking, inter alia, a judicial validation of
the replacement of directors. PCC and its representatives filed a counterclaim arguing, inter alia, that MGM
management breached their fiduciary duty to PCC, in its capacity as majority shareholder, by failing to implement a
sales transaction that the counterclaimants envisaged in order to regain control over MGM. The Delaware Court
concluded that CLBN’s action to replace PCC’s representatives from MGM’s board was valid and effective.
Defendants’ counterclaim was dismissed as not proven. For other cases upholding the vicinity of insolvency
doctrine see also Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In Re Buckhead Am. Corp. 178 B.R. 956 (D.
Del. 1994); In Re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc., 225 B.R. 646 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998).
35
Thomas R. Califano, A Shift in Fiduciary Duties, THE NAT’L L. J. (17 September 2001).
36
Credit Lyonnais, supra note 34 at 247.
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maximize the corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity.”37 Similar to the previously
discussed decisions of the Delaware Court of Chancery, Credit Lyonnais referred alternately and
interchangeably to the best interests of the corporation and to the interests of various
stakeholders.
Chancellor Allen used a numerical example to illustrate the conflicting incentives that
shareholders and creditors have when the firm becomes financially troubled,38 and he concluded
that:
[I]n managing the business affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency,
circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the
corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees,
or any single group interested in the corporation) would make if given the opportunity to act.39
37
38

Id. at 248.
Allen uses the following example:
The possibility of insolvency can do curious things to incentives, exposing creditors to risks of
opportunistic behavior and creating complexities for directors. Consider, for example, a solvent corporation
having a single asset, a judgment for $51 million against a solvent debtor. The judgment is on appeal and
thus subject to modification or reversal. Assume that the only liabilities of the company are to bondholders
in the amount of $12 million. Assume that the array of probable outcomes of the appeal is as follows:
Expected Value
25% chance of affirmance ($51mm)
$12.75
70% chance of modification ($4mm)
$2.8
5% chance of reversal ($0)
$0
Expected Value of Judgment on Appeal
$15.55

Thus, the best evaluation is that the current value of the equity is $3.55 million. ($15.55 million expected
value of judgment on appeal $12 million liability to bondholders). Now assume an offer to settle at $12.5
million (also consider one at $17.5 million). By what standard do the directors of the company evaluate the
fairness of these offers? The creditors of this solvent company would be in favor of accepting either a $12.5
million offer or a $17.5 million offer. In either event they will avoid the 75% risk of insolvency and default.
The stockholders, however, will plainly be opposed to acceptance of a $12.5 million settlement (under
which they get practically nothing). More importantly, they very well may be opposed to acceptance of the
$17.5 million offer under which the residual value of the corporation would increase from $3.5 to $5.5
million. This is so because the litigation alternative, with its 25% probability of a $39 million outcome to
them ($51 millon -- $12 million $39 million) has an expected value to the residual risk bearer of $9.75
million ($39 million x 25% chance of affirmance), substantially greater than the $5.5 million available to
them in the settlement. While in fact the stockholders' preference would reflect their appetite for risk, it is
possible (and with diversified shareholders likely) that shareholders would prefer rejection of both
settlement offers.
But if we consider the community of interests that the corporation represents it seems apparent that one
should in this hypothetical accept the best settlement offer available providing it is greater than $15.55
million, and one below that amount should be rejected. But that result will not be reached by a director who
thinks he owes duties directly to shareholders only. It will be reached by directors who are capable of
conceiving of the corporation as a legal and economic entity. Id at 321-329
39
Id. at 329.
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The decision in Credit Lyonnais raised more questions than it answered. Firstly, the court
did not provide any guidelines for determining the vicinity of insolvency zone.40 Secondly, it
failed to identify clearly the recipient of fiduciary duties, by referring successively to the best
interests of the firm and to the interests of all constituencies. Thirdly, no explanations were
provided as to what are the best interests of the corporation or the collective interests of
stakeholders and how the directors are supposed to further such interests.
Other Court decisions have set forth different criteria for determining when the fiduciary
duties shift so as to include creditors. In Re Healthco Int'l Inc. the bankruptcy court found that
the fiduciary duties could include creditors if a showing was made similar to that required under
fraudulent conveyance statutes, i.e., that there was an “unreasonably small capital.”41 In Geron
v. Schulman (In re Manshul Const. Corp.) the court held that a corporation with “unreasonably
small capital” is one that is “technically solvent but doomed to fail.”42
Despite the pronouncement of these cases, no case exists that actually holds a director
liable for a breach of a direct fiduciary duty to creditors. As Ribstein and Alces observed,
“[m]any cases have dicta supporting special director duties to creditors … or at least a special
40

Because “vicinity of insolvency” is a vague concept, it is often argued that it is impossible to determine when the
fiduciary duties should shift from shareholders to creditors (or should broaden to include the creditors). See e.g.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency,
forthcoming J. BUS. TECH. L. (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=832504. In response to this
inconvenience, certain guidelines have been advanced to determine whether or not the firm is in the insolvency
zone. The shift of fiduciary duties shall occur whenever insolvency in fact is reasonably foreseeable or when
directors engage in a transaction that would raise the specter of insolvency in fact. See Brad Eric Scheler, Necessity,
the Mother of Invention, Strikes Again: Deepening Insolvency – Dissecting the Decisions of Directors and Officers
in the Zone of Insolvency Through a Rearview Looking Glass, ANN. SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 227 (2005). The
insolvency in fact can be determined based on two tests: the balance sheet test (when liabilities exceed assets) and
the cash-flow test (when the corporation is unable to pay its debts as they fall due in the ordinary course of
business). Id at 288. See also James Sprayregen et al., The Zone of Insolvency: When Has a Company Entered into
It, and Once There, What are the Board’s Duties?, Bankruptcy 2002: Views From The Bench, Washington, D.C.,
September 20, 2002, available at http: //www.kirkland.com/files/tbl _s14 Publications/Document1303.pdf.
41
208 B.R. 288, 302 (D. Mass 1997).
42
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12576, 154-55 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2000) (enumerating several factors that are used to
evaluate the adequacy of firm’s capital: debt-to-equity ratio, historical capital cushion and need for working capital).
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duty to balance duties to shareholders and creditors.”43

Notwithstanding the lack of legal

authority of such decisions, creditors continue to invoke them as a warning against potential
managerial liability.44
Most scholars have rejected the idea that directors should ever owe creditors direct
fiduciary duties. They have done so using various justifications. For example, one theory
running counter to the shifting fiduciary duties approach is the stakeholder theory, which claims
that the fiduciary duties impose on managers the obligation to attend to the interests of all
stakeholders, regardless of whether the firm is solvent or insolvent.45 An analogous theory holds
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Ribstein & Alces, supra note 6 at 2.
Id.
45
The stakeholder approach holds that economic value is created by people who voluntarily come together and
cooperate to improve everyone’s status. For this reason, regardless of the ultimate goal of the firm, the corporate
managers must take into account the legitimate interests of all groups that affect or are affected by the firm’s
business. Furthermore, it is argued that this theory is consistent with the shareholder wealth maximization norm,
since creating value for other stakeholders ultimately creates value for shareholders. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN,
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM L. REV. 1416, 1416-1448 (1989). See also Bernard Black, Corporate Law and
Residual Claimants, Berkeley Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/27; Joseph Mahoney et al. Towards a Property Rights Foundation for a
Stakeholder Theory of the Firm, 9 J. MGMT GOV. 5, 5-32 (2005); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director
Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 403, 403-447 (2001); R. Edward
Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory, 4 BUS. ETHICS. Q. 409, 409-421 (1994); R.Edward Freeman &
William M. Evan, Corporate Governance: A Stakeholder Interpretation, 19 J BEHAVIORAL ECON. 337, 337-359
(1990); R. Edward Freeman et al., What Stakeholder Theory Is Not, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 479, 479-502 (2003);
Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation – Concepts, Evidence and
Implication, 20 ACAD. MANAGEMENT REV. 69, 65-91 (1995).
The idea that the business relies on the inputs of various constituencies, and, therefore, their interests must
be equally taken into account, is the core of other theories, very similar with the stakeholder theory: the corporate
social responsibility theory, and the team production theory. See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE
POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (2005); David Baron, Private Politics, Corporate
Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy, 10 J. ECON. MGMT. STRAT. 7, 7-45 (2001); Margaret Blair & Lynn
Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 248, 248-328 (1999); Allen Kaufman et al., A
Team Production Model of Corporate Governance Revisited, George Washington University SMPP Working Paper
No. 03-03 (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=410080.
The stakeholder doctrine has been criticized for imposing unnecessary complexity on manager’ duties, if
they were required to serve the interests of all constituencies. In such a scenario, the managers would have to
evaluate and balance the claims of all stakeholders before adopting a decision, usually in a very short period of time.
This decision-making process could be expected to affect the quality of managerial decisions. Additionally, the
stakeholder theory fails to provide guidelines for managers, when they are faced with the task of mediating the
conflicting stakeholder interests. See ABA Comm. On Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for
Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253 (1990). In the same line of thought, Jensen pointed out that “it is logically
impossible to maximize in more than one dimension at the same time unless the dimensions are monotone
transformations of one another. The result will be confusion and lack of purpose that will fundamentally handicap
44
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that the fiduciary duties are owed to the corporation itself, regarded as an entity distinct from its
constituencies, notwithstanding the firm’s solvency status.46 In promoting the best interests of the

the firm in its competition for survival.” Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the
Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 8, 8-21 (2001).
46
See Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty,
98 MICH. L. REV. 214 (1999). Smith argues that economic efficiency imposes as default rule directors’ obligation to
maximize the value of the corporation, namely “the sum of the value of financial claims against the corporation.” Id.
at 218. The “neotraditional” approach proposed by Smith envisages a fiduciary duty owed to the corporation itself,
but the exercising thereof “would benefit one class of claimants and sometimes another, depending on the
circumstances” Id. at 218-219. Smith’s approach suffers from several shortcomings: (i) It does not explain the
concept of “sum of value of all financial claims” – is this notion referring to a distinct element (the maximization of
which ensures the maximization of the specific stakeholder interests)? Is it referring to the same stakeholder wealth
maximization advocated by the stakeholder theory? Or is it simply referring to making the aggregate financial
claims against the firm Kaldor-Hicks superior? It appears that his theory advocates the latter answer. (ii) How are
directors supposed to maximize this sum? Can directors pursue the interests of any one constituency, as long as the
value of the “sum” is increased? Smith’s neotraditional approach resembles our model in that it shifts the focus of
the fiduciary duties from the stakeholders to the corporation. Smith’s model, however, equates the interests of the
corporation with the sum of all financial claims against the firm and thus redirects the analysis towards the corporate
constituencies.
Another theory advocating fiduciary duties owed to the corporation is developed by Laura Lin, Shift of
Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1485
(1993). Lin analyzes the scenario in which the directors have the obligation to maximize the company’s value even
when the firm is in financial distress and even if this action diverges from what shareholders or creditors would have
chosen Id. at 1487. To this end, the “directors should pursue the projects that have positive net present value to the
company as a whole, and not just a positive effect on either debt or equity” Id. at 1497. This approach is very similar
with the theory developed by this article, but Lin discards this path mainly for unenforceability reasons. Lin points
out that “as the company’s financial condition becomes more precarious, neither shareholders nor creditors have
incentives to ensure that directors are taking actions that promote the firm’s long-term profitability. Therefore, a
default rule that requires directors to maximize the firm’s value is of little benefit if it lacks an effective enforcement
mechanism” Id. at 1509 (citations omitted). The soundness of this argument is questionable for several reasons: (i)
Firstly, it mixes the interests of the corporation with the specific interests of stakeholders. As we will demonstrate in
Section 4 here under, the stakeholders’ preferences for specific business strategies are not relevant for maximizing
the value of the firm; this is true both in and out of insolvency. (ii) Even if we admit that stakeholders’ interests are
relevant for the business strategy, such interests are essentially heterogeneous, both within the same constituency
and among different classes of stakeholders. Therefore, we call in question the accuracy of the conclusion that, near
insolvency, none of the constituencies would be interested in positive net present value projects. On the contrary, as
we explain in Section 5, the bond covenants usually comprise provisions that thwart shareholders’ incentives to
underinvest by selecting negative net present value projects. The effect of such provisions is to direct the company
towards positive net present value projects. (iii) If maximizing the value of the firm is the default rule imposed by
fiduciary duties, the approach of the zone of insolvency signals to the stakeholders the potential occurrence of
director misbehavior. Therefore, stakeholders have strong incentives to enforce this fiduciary duty (derivatively),
preventing thus the entrance in the insolvency zone. (iv) The enforcement of fiduciary duties is always restricted by
the by the business judgment rule, which imposes limitations on judicial scrutiny over managerial decisions. This is
not to say, however, that any attempt to develop a legally and economically valid model for fiduciary duties is futile.
As we mentioned herein above, a sound analysis of the fiduciary duties must distinguish between the procedural and
the substantive aspects thereof.
Lin concludes that, despite its disadvantages, the most efficient rule for fiduciary duties is to impose on
directors the obligation “to maximize shareholders’ interests regardless of the firm’s financial condition”, while
creditors would contract specifically for directors’ obligation to maximize the company’s value Id. at 1500, 1510.
We believe that this approach has a significant potential for confusion, for directors as well as for stakeholders. Such
a fiduciary duty would make shareholders the direct beneficiaries of fiduciary duties. Consequently, directors would
have to accommodate the various interests of shareholders in order not to breach their fiduciary duties. If the specific
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corporation, the directors serve the interests of all constituencies. This opinion was expressed by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples Department Stores v. Wise. In this case, the Court
argued that the concept of “vicinity of insolvency” is impossible to be defined and is void of any
legal meaning.47 Therefore, directors’ fiduciary duties do not change when the firm is in the
nebulous “vicinity of insolvency.”48 In other words,
interests of minority shareholders were different from those of the majority, directors could be faced with an
inextricable stalemate. Moreover, knowing that directors owe fiduciary duties to shareholders, creditors would
charge a higher premium for the increased risk of breach of contract, which won’t be economically efficient for the
firm.
For other theories endorsing fiduciary duties owed to the corporation see Alon Chaver & Jesse M. Fried
Managers’ Fiduciary Duty Upon the Firm’s Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1813, 1817 (2002) (pointing out that “an insolvent firm’s managers should have as their objective the maximization
of the sum of the values of all claims -both financial and performance- against the firm.”) Gregory S. Crespi,
Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Duties: The Inefficiency of the Shareholder Primacy Norm, 55 SMU L. REV. 141,
143 (2002) (demonstrating that, for both public and closely-held corporations, economic efficiency would be
enhanced if directors’ fiduciary duties were construed as running to the corporation, and not solely to its
shareholders).
The idea that the corporation is an entity distinct from its constituencies, however, is challenged by the
contractarian theory of the firm. According to this theory, the firm is a network of explicit and implicit contracts
among various suppliers of inputs acting together to produce goods or to provide services. see e.g. STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (2002). Other authors within this school of thought have
referred to the firm as a “black box” or an “empty box”, operated so as to maximize profits by meeting the relevant
marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 306-307 (1976). In
rejecting the reification of the corporation promoted by the traditional corporate law theory, the contractarians point
out that the corporation is neither an entity, nor a thing capable of being owned. See also WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN
C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 117-18 (9th ed 2004)
[Klein & Coffee hereinafter]; Smith, supra note 46 at 214 (noting that “[t]o economically oriented corporate law
professors, distinguishing between directors’ fiduciary duty to shareholders and a duty to the corporation itself
smacks of reification – treating the fictional corporate entity as if it were a real thing.”). Another theory denying the
firm’s status as a separate legal entity is the “connected contracts” theory. The promoters of this theory claim that
“there are no firms, no predetermined hierarchies, no organizations with personalities of their own, and no a priori
notions of ownership or control; there is no shareholder or managerial primacy and no centralizing ‘nexus’”. The
core element of the connected contracts perspective is the putative bargain over control. The business activity
consists of bargains among individuals who agree to undertake a specific project. G. Mitu Gulati, William A. Klein
and Eric M. Zolt, Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 887 (2000). See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board
of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2002) (developing a corporate model in which the board of
directors represents a sui generis body, serving as the nexus for the various contracts making up the corporation; in
this setting, the board’s powers flow from the totality of connected contracts, and not just from shareholders).
47
People's Department Stores Ltd. (1992) Inc., Re, 244 D.L.R. (4th) 564, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 326 N.R. 267 (Fr.),
326 N.R. 267 (Eng.), 2004 SCC 68, affirming People's Department Stores Ltd. (1992) Inc., Re, 224 D.L.R. (4th)
509, [2003] R.J.Q. 796, 41 C.B.R. (4th) 225, J.E. 2003-499, [2003] Q.J. No. 505, REJB 2003-37254 (C.A. Que. Feb
05, 2003), reversing People's Department Stores Ltd. (1992) Inc., Re, 23 C.B.R. (4th) 200, [1999] R.R.A. 178, J.E.
99-318, [1998] Q.J. No. 3571, REJB 1998-09776 (C.S. Que. Dec 15, 1998). Wise Stores Inc. was a chain of junior
department stores. Lionel Wise, Ralph Wise and Harold Wise were majority shareholders, officers and directors of
Wise Stores. Through a leveraged buyout, Wise Stores acquired Peoples Department Stores Inc. from its parent,
Marks & Spencer Canada Inc. The bulk of the sell price was to be paid in installments, over a period of eight years.
Following the acquisition, the Wise Brothers were appointed directors of Peoples. They implemented a joint
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[t]he various shifts in interests that naturally occur as the corporation’s fortunes rise and fall
do not, however, affect the content of the fiduciary duty... At all times, directors and
officers owe their fiduciary obligation to the corporation. The interests of the corporation
are not to be confused with the interests of the creditors or those of any other
stakeholders.49

The directors continue to have the obligation to act in the best interests of the corporation
by maximizing the value of the firm.50 To this end, they could be required to consider, inter alia,
the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and the
environment.51
Both the theory promoting the shift of fiduciary duties and the stakeholder theory have
been regarded by many scholars as unpersuasive attempts to depart from the traditional
shareholder wealth maximization norm.

According to such authors, the long-established

American corporate law tradition imposed on directors the obligation to maximize shareholder
wealth.52

As Robert Clark wrote, “…from the traditional legal viewpoint, a corporation’s

inventory procurement policy, which led to Peoples extending a significant trade credit to Wise Stores and incurring
huge losses. As a consequence, Marks & Spencer sought and obtained a court order appointing an interim trustee to
control Peoples’ assets. In response, Peoples and Wise Stores sought protection under the bankruptcy regulations.
Both Wise and Peoples were declared bankrupt a short while after. Following the bankruptcy, Peoples’ trustee filed
with the Quebec Superior Court a petition against the Wise Brothers, claiming that, by implementing a procurement
policy that favored the interests of Wise Stores over those of Peoples, the Wise Brothers breached their fiduciary
duties towards Peoples’ creditors. The trial judge decided that the Wise Brothers breached their fiduciary duties
owed to the company’s creditors. The Wise Brothers appealed and the decision of the trial court was reversed. The
Court of Appeal ruled that the Wise Brothers acted in good faith, with a view to further the interests of the company,
and, therefore, they did not breach the fiduciary duties. The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal’s
decision.
48
Id.
49
Id. at para. 43.
50
Id. at para. 42.
51
Id.
52
This theory claims that the primary purpose of a corporation is to make profit for its shareholders. The most
important arguments invoked in support of this norm are: the residual claimants argument, the agency costs
argument and the hypothetical bargain argument.
The residual claimants argument states that fiduciary duties should be owed exclusively to shareholders
because, in their capacity as residual claimants, they have the best incentives to maximize the value of the firm. See
FRANK R. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW, 63, 67 (1996)
(“[W]hy do shareholders alone have voting rights? […] The reason is that shareholders are the residual claimants to
the firm's income.”); Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. ECON. 395, 403 (1983) (noting that “[a]s the residual
claimants, the shareholders are the group with the appropriate incentives […] to make discretionary decisions.”;
“The shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal cost. They therefore have the
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right incentives to exercise discretion”); See also Robert L. Lipper, Agency Conflicts, Managerial Compensation,
and Firm Variance, 9 J. FIN. STRAT. DECISIONS 39, 39-47 (1996).
Several authors, however, consider that the changing nature of the firm in the contemporary business world
renders tenuous the conventional idea that shareholders are the sole residual claimants. These authors point out that
other groups of claimants, such as employees, creditors, option holders, customers and even the state, stand to gain
when the firm is prosperous and suffer when business does badly. Therefore, they are corporate residual claimants,
alongside with the shareholders. See Black, Corporate Law and Residual Claimants, supra note 45; Joseph
Mahoney et al., Towards a Property Rights Foundation, supra note 45; Blair & Stout, Director Accountability,
supra note 45.
Other authors argue that the purpose of fiduciary duties is to protect shareholders against the agency costs
generated by the separation between ownership and control, specific to public corporations. In 1932, Adolf Berle
and Gardiner Means articulated the concept of separation between ownership and control, in their landmark book
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1993). The premise for the separation of the two prerogatives
is that one party, who owns property (in the sense of controlling and deriving the residual benefit from such
property), but who lacks the necessary skill and information to manage its property, delegates open-ended
management power to another person. In such a legal relationship, the controllers have the incentive to use their
powers for their own benefit rather than to enrich the owners. In those situations where it would be costly or
impracticable for the owner to monitor and effectively discipline the controller’s performance, the rights of the
owner must be protected by the statutory fiduciary duties owed by the controller. In the corporate context, the
separation between ownership and control implies an open-ended delegation of powers from shareholders to the
board of directors. In large public corporations, such separation results in acquiring by the management of a largely
autonomous position in relation to shareholders. This conclusion has as premise the fact that the shareholders of a
public company are widely dispersed and no single shareholder owns a controlling percentage of the share capital.
Because of collective action problems and rational apathy, the isolated shareholders are unable to coordinate their
activities, and effective control of the corporation ends up in the hands of management. This situation justifies the
protection of shareholders by fiduciary duties. For a detailed analysis of separation between ownership and control,
see Larry E. Ribstein, The Structure of the Fiduciary Relationship U. Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper 7,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=397641 (2003). See also Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freeman, The Fiduciary
Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991); J.C. Shepherd,
Towards a Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 L.Q. REV. 51 (1981).
Another theory states that the fiduciary duty for the benefit of shareholders is a bargained-for contractual
term in the nexus of contracts setting that represents the corporation. The contractarian theory (or the nexus of
contracts theory) views the firm as a network of explicit and implicit contracts among various suppliers of inputs,
acting together to produce goods or to provide services. In this framework, the shareholder wealth maximization is a
bargained-for obligation of the board-shareholder contract. Stated differently, in a hypothetical bargain setting, the
shareholders would negotiate for contractual terms imposing on directors fiduciary duties that incorporate the
shareholder wealth maximization norm. The shareholders’ position within the contractual framework renders them
more exposed to director misbehavior, as compared to other corporate constituencies, and, therefore, justifies
fiduciary duties for the benefit of shareholders. The increased vulnerability of shareholders is generated by the
specificity of their equity investment and by the “indefinite relationship” with the directors, which is rarely the
outcome of detailed negotiations. Creditors, on the other hand, have the possibility to fashion tailor-made terms and
conditions in the debt contract, in accordance with their attitude towards risk. Creditors, therefore, have the ability to
insure themselves against the risk of default, by including an adequate risk premium in the amount of the interest or
the price they charge. See generally Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little?, supra note 32 at 28;
Some authors questioned the soundness of the conventional arguments for shareholder wealth
maximization norm. See generally Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002) (claiming that the ownership and sole residual claimants arguments are bad “in the sense
that they are built on empirical claims that are demonstrably false” (Id. at 1208); a “much more reasonable”
justification for shareholder primacy is given by the existence of agency costs (Id.). The author further argues that
all stakeholders are made better off by a rule that prevents directors from shirking, stealing or engaging in other selfinterested activities that would have a negative effect on the price of the shares).
Sundaram and Inkpen offer a different classification of arguments for shareholder wealth maximization.
Their reasons are: (i) The goal of maximizing shareholder value is pro-stakeholder (in the sense that shareholders, as
residual claimants have incentives to maximize the total value of the firm, which benefits the fixed claimants as
well); (ii) Maximizing shareholder value creates proper incentives for managers to assume entrepreneurial risks (as
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directors and officers have a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth, subject to numerous
duties to meet specific obligations to other groups affected by the corporation.” (emphasis
added)53
The most influential case endorsing the shareholder wealth maximization norm is,
arguably, Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.54 In Dodge v. Ford the court was confronted with two
opposing assertions regarding the purpose of the corporation: increasing the shareholder wealth
versus benefiting the pool of stakeholders contributing to the firm. In response to Henry Ford’s
allegations, claiming that the corporation had an obligation to benefit the public, the employees
opposed to managing on behalf of fixed claimants, which exacerbates the incentives for entrepreneurial risk
aversion); (iii) It is impossible to manage the business on behalf of multiple constituencies when their goals are in
conflict (as opposed to promoting shareholder value, which is an observable and measurable metric); (iv) It is easier
for other constituencies to become shareholders than vice versa (claiming that other constituencies can easily
become shareholders if they become concerned about managerial abuse); (v) In case of contractual breach, the other
constituencies have contractual and judicial remedies (non-share owning stakeholders have judicial recourse through
invocation of contractual and tort laws that shareholders typically do not). See Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew K.
Inkpen, The Corporate Objective Revisited, 15 ORG. SCI. 350, 350-363 (2004). For a spirited critique of Sundaram
& Inkpen’s arguments see R. Edward Freeman et al., Stakeholder Theory and ‘The Corporate Objective Revisited’,
15 ORG. SCI. 364, 364-369 (2004).
For an analysis of the fundaments and developments of shareholder wealth maximization norm see also
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, 33 N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE 122-126
(1970) (noting that “the key point is that, in his capacity as a corporate executive, the manager is the agent of the
individuals who own the corporation or establish the eleemosynary institution, and his primary responsibility is to
them”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor
Green, 50 WASH. LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993) (pointing out that that the principle of shareholder wealth maximization
is both a valid positive account of corporate law and a legitimate normative proposition); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (arguing that
director primacy can be reconciled with the board's obligation to maximize the value of the shareholders' residual
claims); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998) (affirming that the
shareholder primacy norm finds its most direct expression within the law relating to fiduciary duties); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) (arguing that
there is a widespread normative consensus that corporate managers should act exclusively in the interests of
shareholders); Wayne D. Gray, Peoples v. Wise and Dylex: Identifying Stakeholder Interests Upon or Near
Corporate Insolvency – Stasis or Pragmatism?, 39 CAN. BUS. L.J. 242, 242 (2003) (“ordinarily the best interests of
the corporation mean the economic interests of its shareholders as a whole”). See also STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 8-10 (7th ed. 2006) (the goal of corporate management is “to make money
or add value for the owners” (i.e. the shareholders), by maximizing the market value of owners’ equity); EUGENE F.
BRIGHAM & JOEL F. HOUSTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 15-17 (10th ed. 2004); LAWRENCE J.
GITMAN & SEAN M. HENNESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF MANAGERIAL FINANCE 18 (2004); HAIM LEVY & MARSHALL
SARNAT, CAPITAL INVESTMENT & FINANCIAL DECISION, 9-11 (4th ed. 1990).
53
ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 678 (1986).
54
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). The Dodge Brothers were minority shareholders of Ford Motor Co. Ford Motor
announced that it intends to cease the dividend payments and retain the earnings for the purpose of expanding the
business. In response, the Dodge Brothers sued, requesting the court to compel Ford Motor to resume the payment
of dividends and to enjoin the envisaged expansion of business. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s order
that the company declare a dividend and reversed the lower court’s injunction that halted company expansion.
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and the customers, the court ruled that “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for
that end.”55 Moreover, the court stated that “it is not within the lawful powers of a board of
directors to shape and conduct the affairs of the corporation for the merely incidental benefit of
the shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others.”56
The shareholder wealth maximization norm was recently reinforced in Katz v. Oak.57
The Delaware Court of Chancery found that directors’ attempt to maximize the long-run interests
of the shareholders at the expense of other constituencies does not amount to a “cognizable legal
wrong”58 and does not constitute a breach of duty, despite the corporation’s declining financial
condition. In substantiating this argument, Chancellor Allen opined that creditors are protected
by “thoroughly negotiated and massively documented” contracts that spell out the rights and the
obligations of the parties.59 Therefore, “[t]he terms of the contractual relationship agreed to and
not broad concepts such as fairness define the corporation’s obligation to its bondholders.”60
Other Delaware cases make a less trenchant stand when tackling shareholder primacy,
but, regrettably, are also somewhat ambiguous. In Loft v. Guth, the Court held that “[w]hile
technically not trustees, [corporate managers] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and
its stockholders.”61
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The best interests of the corporation and the shareholders’ interests are commonly
linked by the legal scholars in order to define the purpose of directors’ fiduciary duties. The
American Law Institute, for example, defines the objective of the corporation as “the conduct of
business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”62 Despite
commonly using this association, the doctrine and the jurisprudence fell short of substantiating
the rationale for using this apparently double standard. If shareholders interests coincide with
those of the firm, what is the purpose of mentioning both? If the interests of the corporation,
regarded as a separate legal entity, differ from the shareholders’, then how are directors supposed
to accommodate them? The tentative answer provided by the American Bar Association only
amplifies the incertitude:
[“Best interests of the corporation”] is an expression of … the corporate director’s primary
allegiance. As the shareholders’ designee, the corporate director is in a position of stewardship
for the owners of the enterprise, whose interests are interchangeably merged with the interests
of the corporate entity.63

In an attempt to sidestep the debate over the purpose of fiduciary duties, some have
argued that the business judgment rule64 would insulate directors’ decisions from judicial review,

directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders”); Columbia Forest
Products v. Firestone Plywood Corp., 5 Misc. 3d 1018 (NY. Sup. 2004) (“[T]he Court has been unable to locate any
cases where a director or officer of a New York Corporation has been held to have a fiduciary duty to corporate
creditors.”).
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The business judgment rule is connected to corporate managers’ duty of care. The duty of care requires directors
and officers to exercise a proper business judgment, namely to act on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that their decision is in the best interests of the corporation A director is considered to act on an
informed basis when he gathers sufficient information about the facts known to him in order to make a reasonably
prudent decision. The directors are not required to possess exhaustive knowledge nor they are expected to reach the
most reasonable decision that a person might have reached; in order to be protected by the business judgment rule,
the decision must be a prudent one. In assessing whether a decision should be protected by the business judgment
rule, the courts must inquire if the directors followed adequate procedures in reaching it (i.e. if the directors properly
informed themselves in advance). As the Delaware Supreme Court stated, “due care in the decision making context
in process due care only” Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. Supr. 2000) (emphasis added). The business
judgment rule prevents the courts from questioning a business decision legitimately reached by the board, even if,
ultimately, the decision proved to be wrong. The rationale of this decision is that the judges are ill fitted to evaluate
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regardless of whose interests they pursue.65 Stated differently, since directors cannot be held
liable in court for their decisions as long as they observe the business judgment rule, it is useless
to attempt to identify the appropriate beneficiary of fiduciary duties. Even if, in theory, a
particular beneficiary of the fiduciary duties could be identified, such stakeholder could not
challenge in court a decision that breached his rights, as long as the decision complies with the
business judgment rule. Ribstein and Alces believe that this limited court authority over the
managerial decisions protecting one constituency or another “is not … only one of the reasons
for the absence of a special duty to creditors, but the only reason.”66
Our approach does not quibble with this answer. Rather, we view this response as
procedural and not substantive in nature. The business judgment rule is a procedural requirement
regarding directors’ decisions, whereas the fiduciary duties controversy concerns the substance
of directors’ rights and obligations.
The analysis of the jurisprudential and the doctrinal position regarding the purpose of
fiduciary duties imposes one conclusion: there is yet no clear distinction between the interests of
the corporation, regarded as a separate entity, and the interests of various constituencies.
Whether stipulating directors’ obligation to take into account the interests of a particular group of
stakeholders, or requiring them to maximize all claims against the firm, all theories focus on the
constituencies, and not on the corporation.
managerial decisions, given their lack of business expertise. Moreover, judicial “second guessing” of business
decisions would make the directors risk averse, to the detriment of the company and of the shareholders, and would
discourage people to undertake the task of acting as director or officer. See generally EDWARD WELCH & ANDREW
TUREZYN, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: FUNDAMENTALS (1998); Klein & Coffee, supra
note 46, at 155.
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supra note 32 at 402-405 (pointing out that directors’ decisions are protected by business judgment rule; however,
the author claims that the analysis of the shift of fiduciary duties may be relevant from the prospect of allocating the
incentives to sue). See also Filippo Rossi, Making Sense of the Delaware Supreme Court’s Triad of Fiduciary
Duties, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=755784 (2005) (claiming that directors’ duty of good faith is a general
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Ribstein & Alces, supra note 6 at 9.
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Our approach will direct the focal point of fiduciary duties toward the firm. In the
following chapters we will show that there is a cause-effect relationship between promoting the
best interests of the corporation and meeting the stakeholders’ and the creditors’ expectations.
Directors do not have to assess and balance the interests of all groups that contribute to the firm’s
wellbeing, as suggested by some court decisions previously analyzed. Such a task would render
managers’ task overwhelmingly complex and, eventually, would impair the quality of their
decisions. We demonstrate that the goal of firm value maximization can be achieved by pursuing
the projects having the highest expected net present value, which does not require the managers
to evaluate the expectations of different corporate constituencies. The result of this policy serves
the interests of both fixed and residual claimants.

3.

The Obligation to Maximize the Value of the Firm

Credit Lyonnais, Production Resource and Peoples Department Stores predicate
fiduciary duties owed the corporation itself. Regrettably, some of these decisions are plagued by
an ominous confusion between the interests of the corporation and the interests of stakeholders.
Arguably, the main cause of this confusion is the absence of a valid model to illustrate the
distinctness of these economic interests. Using several well-established finance concepts, we will
demonstrate that the corporation has a specific economic interest, which should be served by
directors’ fiduciary duties.
In order to highlight the separation between the interests of the firm and those of
stakeholders, the firm shall be regarded as an independent legal entity, distinct from its
constituencies. Although a good part of the legal doctrine is inclined to reject any theoretical
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construction that “smacks of reification”,67 reification is unavoidable for a proper analysis of
fiduciary duties. Several vital legal principles having great relevance in the area of fiduciary
duties (such as the individuality of firm’s patrimony, the value of the firm, shareholders’ limited
liability, etc.) are grounded on the principle of the firm’s separate legal capacity. The reification
is also justified economically by the concepts we use to develop our model (e.g. the Fisher
Separation theorem).
Besides the finance arguments, once we regard the corporation as a distinct entity, it is
highly intuitive to affirm that directors must defend the best interests of the corporation they are
managing. In this light, the claim that a director should be the guardian of the interests of other
firms, in their capacity as shareholders or creditors, appears as irrational. Such entities would
have their own managers to watch after their welfare, by enforcing the contractual or legal
remedies granted to shareholders or creditors. The same intuition applies to individual
shareholders and creditors as well: while the managers’ task is to enhance the value of the firm,
individual debt or equity investors should turn to the available contractual or legal safeguards, in
order to ensure that their legitimate interests are not jeopardized in the process.68
The idea that fiduciary duties are owed to the corporation hs been expressed by many
legal authors. Ribstein and Alces, for example, note that “corporate fiduciaries do not have a
special duty to a particular corporate constituency, including creditors. Rather, they have
67

Smith, supra note 46 at 1.
One might argue that, in the pursuit of firm value maximization, fairness ought not to be the tradeoff for
efficiency. While this may be a legitimate and equitable point, we believe that it would be hazardous to impose
fairness at the foundation of managers’ fiduciary duties. Apart from the genuine complexity of this concept, which
renders it almost impossible to define or quantify, fairness is much akin to equality, justice, morality or charity.
Hence, identifying the role of fairness in the corporate world appears more as the privilege of the legal philosopher
rather than the task of the law maker. Of course, shareholders, like creditors or any other constituency, have the right
to seek relief if they consider that their legitimate interests have been unfairly disregarded by corporate managers.
But, since the analysis of fairness is inexorably fact-oriented, it is up to the courts to decide what is fair and what is
not in a particular case. Otherwise, the mercantile world would struggle with vague philosophical concepts as basic
guidelines. For an interesting essay on fairness versus efficiency in the environmental law background, see Shi LingHsu, Fairness Versus Efficiency in Environmental Law, 33 ECO. L. Q. 303 (2004). See also Ian B. Lee, Efficiency
and Ethics in the Debate about Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533 (2006).
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fiduciary ad care duties to their principal, the corporation.”69 But affirming that directors have
the obligation to act in the best interests of the corporation, by maximizing its value, only begins
the scrutiny of fiduciary duties. The really sensitive question is: Is it possible for managers to
determine which projects would maximize the value of the firm, if they do not refer to the
precise interests of a particular constituency? We believe it is possible.70
Economic theory offers the answer to this question. The corporate finance distinguishes
between the economic profit and the accounting profit of a firm. While the accounting definition
of profit refers to the net income of the corporation,71 the economists use the word “profit” to
illustrate the rates of return exceeding the opportunity cost for funds employed in a certain
project.72 In order to estimate the economic profit, the managers must determine the time pattern
of cash flows generated by the projects.73 Moreover, managers need to calculate the present
value of future cash flow streams associated with various projects, to be able to determine ex
ante the most valuable project. This result can be achieved by the method commonly referred to
as the “discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation.”74 The discounted stream of cash flows is
considered by finance scholars as the appropriate benchmark to be used by managers, when
making investment decisions.75
From this viewpoint, the value of a firm is determined by the value of the cash flows it is
able to generate.76 Coming back to the purpose of fiduciary duties, the goal of firm value
maximization can be expressed as the obligation of corporate directors to select from among the
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available projects those that generate the highest present value of cash flow streams.77 Stated
differently directors’ fiduciary duties would require them o select the projects with the highest
expected net present value (“NPV”).78
Cash flow measures are of vital importance not only for corporate managers, but for
shareholders and creditors as well. Equity and debt investors tend to focus on firm’s ability to
generate cash to pay off dividends, loans or commodities, rather than on accounting earnings.79
The reason for this is obvious, once we refer to the cash flow identity formula. This formula
equates the cash flow generated by the firm’s assets with the cash flow paid to suppliers of debt
and equity capital.80 Stated differently, this equation illustrates that the cash flow generated by
the firm’s various activities is either used to pay creditors, or paid out to company’s
shareholders.81
The value of the cash flows generated by the firm is a common denominator for the
interests of the corporation on one hand, and the interest of equity and debt investors on the
other. This shows that the economic interests of various stakeholders are in fact aligned with the
best interests of the firm. Although stakeholders may have contradictory preferences as to the
optimal risk level of the projects to be selected by the corporation, we will demonstrate below
that this heterogeneity is not relevant for the purpose of firm value maximization. Moreover, we
will show that maximizing the value of the corporation by selecting the projects with the highest
net present value equally serves stakeholders’ expectations. Serving the interests of corporate
77
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constituencies is, however, the effect of fiduciary duties, not their object. Limiting the scope of
fiduciary duties to maximizing the value of the firm is a simple and efficient way to circumvent
the daunting task of assessing ex ante the effects the business decisions have on each
constituency, without jeopardizing such interests.

4.

The Irrelevance of the Shareholders’ and Creditors’ Specific Incentives for the
Purpose of Firm Value Maximization

In this section we will demonstrate that directors can attain the firm value maximization
objective irrespective of shareholders’ and creditors’ divergent incentives in the vicinity of
insolvency.
As we mentioned above,82 various legal scholars claim that, as the corporation nears
insolvency, there is a growing conflict between the interests of shareholders and those of other
corporate constituencies, especially creditors. In this scenario, the pursuit by corporate managers
of the interests of one group of stakeholders is invariably construed as negatively affecting the
interests of the rival constituency.
From an economic theory angle, determining which constituency should be looked after
by directors in the vicinity of insolvency is equivalent to identifying the type of business
financing that should be protected by fiduciary duties under financial distress: equity
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(shareholders’ investments) or debt (financing by creditors, i.e. holders of debt securities83 and
trade creditors).84
If fiduciary duties are regard as requiring directors to maximize the value of the firm, by
using the Modigliani-Miller theorem we can demonstrate that, above the optimal level of debt,
the value of the firm cannot be increased by altering the debt-equity ratio. In other words, as long
as debt is maintained at the optimal level, there is no justification for promoting shareholders’ or
creditors’ specific interests for the purpose of firm value maximization.
In the real world however, the actual benefits of debt exceed the tax advantages
illustrated by the MM theorem. Equally, the shortcomings of debt are not limited to bankruptcy
costs. As we will point out, the insight of the MM theorem is not invalidated by the additional
features of debt: Again an optimal level of debt can be found that trades off its real-world
benefits and costs.
Originally, the Modigliani-Miller theorem (“MM theorem”) hypothesized that, under
certain explicit and implicit assumptions (such as perfect capital markets, perfect information,
the absence of bankruptcy costs, of personal taxes and of agency costs), the value of the firm is
independent of its capital structure.85 In other words, the value of a corporation depends on its
profitability and not on how the firm is financed the value of the firm was invariant to its capital
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structure.

Other scholars have modified this result by looking at special cases where the

assumptions behind the MM theorem do not hold.
The basic MM theorem can be seen as follows. Suppose there is a firm that lives for one
period. The firm has a cash flow x that has an expected value of E[x]. The face value of debt is
D and the shareholders are the residual claimants. The shareholders will receive the maximum
of x-D or $0. The debtholders have first claim on the cash flow if the firm can not pay them D.
Hence, the debtholders will receive the minimum of D or x. The value of equity, therefore, is
E[max [0,x-D]], while the value of debt is E[min [x, D]]. The value of the firm is the value of
equity plus the value of debt, which is equal to E[max [0,x-D]]+E[min [x,D]]=E[x]. The value of
the firm is independent of capital structure as only the expected value of x determines the value.
When corporate taxes are taken into account, the analysis gets complicated. Suppose
interest payments are tax deductible, then the value of equity is E[max [0,x-(1-t)D]], where t is
the corporate tax rate, the value of debt is E[min [x,D]], and the value of the firm is E[x]+E[tD |
x>D]. Now the value of the firm is increasing in the amount of debt and this suggests that the
firm should be fully leveraged. This is never observed, nor would anyone believe this to be a
reasonable strategy.
Various authors have sought to explain what could be constraining the leverage decisions
of a firm, with a view to determining the optimal debt level. For example, a group of scholars
argued that as the firm borrows more, there is a higher risk of bankruptcy costs. These costs can
be direct, such as the expenses that need to be paid to lawyers when liquidating the assets of a
firm. They can also be indirect, such as lost profits, the disruption of supplies, managers
demanding higher compensation for potential unemployment and other such costs that may result
if the firm declared bankruptcy. In fact, bankruptcy costs can be taken to be a metaphor for all
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such disadvantages that a highly leveraged firm may signal to market participants.86 If taxes and
bankruptcy costs were the only costs and benefits to debt and equity, the discussion would be
trivial. Debt, in fact, has many other advantages beyond tax deductions.
Agency costs, those costs that arise from the inability of shareholders to perfectly monitor
the firm’s managers, are one such advantage of debt. This insight to finance literature was
introduced in a seminal article by Jensen and Meckling.87 In this article they identified two
sources of conflicts: one between the shareholders and the managers and the second between the
shareholders and creditor.88 Increasing the ratio of debt to equity can solve both of these
conflicts, Jensen and Meckling argued.89 More debt means that managers now have a higher
percentage of ownership in the firm, thereby increasing their incentives to act in the best interests
of the remaining shareholders.90 More debt also means that more cash flow is needed to service
the interest payments, and this forces the managers to focus on increasing cash flows by seeking
higher net present value projects.91
The more debt the firm accumulates, however, the higher the potential for shareholders to
wish that the managers (who now also own an increasing share of the firm) to go for broke by
investing riskier projects. Creditors who anticipate this behavior will either saddle the debt with
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restrictive covenants such as the ones we say earlier or increase the interest rate charged, thereby
making debt costly. At some point, there is an optimal debt equity ratio that balances the
benefits and costs of debt. Just like the tradeoff between taxes and bankruptcy costs, there is a
tradeoff between controlling managers and being controlled by weary creditors.
The level of debt can be related to other conflicts between managers and shareholders as
well. Managers may actually want the firm to continue its operations, since this guarantees them
employment, while the shareholders may prefer the firm wind up and liquidate allowing them to
salvage some value.92 If there is little or no debt, the managers may be able to prolong the life of
the firm beyond its optimal life, as the shareholders would desire. Hence, by the firm taking on
some debt, managers may have no choice but to liquidate especially if the creditors force the
firm into insolvency. This generates valuable information for the investors in both the good and
bad financial times. When the firm is able to pay its interest payments, shareholders are assured
of the quality of the firm’s investments, and if the firm must go bankrupt, the information
generated in the liquidation proceedings allow the shareholders (and creditors) to investigate the
options available. Had there been no debt, the managers may not have wound up the firm until
there was absolutely no value left to salvage.
An increased level of debt is associated with the perspective of a costly winding up and
liquidation process (i.e. with bankruptcy costs). A high debt-equity ratio may also trigger
managers’ incentive to underinvest in profitable projects. The underinvestment incentive is the
mirror image of the “going for broke” scenario. Managers may have less of an incentive to invest
in profitable projects due to the higher possibility of bankruptcy, which will mean that the
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managers will not reap much benefit from those projects. Again an optimal level of debt can be
found that trades off these benefits and costs.
Much of these concerns regarding shareholders, managers, and creditors come from the
fact that the shareholders and creditors have a hard time monitoring the managers. Asymmetric
information prevents the various parties from being honest players in the market, and hence the
need to resort to covenants by creditors and debt by shareholders. One way to alleviate the
concerns regarding the lack of information is to enhance ones’ reputation.93 Several studies have
suggested that reputation can overcome many of the concerns that creditors may have regarding
the temptation to undertake risky projects.94 Older firms with reputations for investing in safe
and less risky projects will be able to attract more debt financing at lower rates, while newer
firms will struggle to raise debt without incurring higher interest rates reflecting creditors’ fears
regarding the “going for broke” strategy. Additionally, managers themselves may wish to have a
reputation for undertaking safe projects as this will enhance their personal reputations in the
event that they are fired from their current firm due to insolvency or other reasons. Mangers will
be, therefore, more conservative in their investment strategies as the market for managers will
evaluate them on how successful their projects are, as opposed to shareholders who might only
be concerned with the expected payoff only.
In fact, risk aversion by managers can defeat any desires by the shareholders for the
pursuit of riskier projects. Since managers are risk-averse, they will want to signal to the market
the quality of their investment projects by taking on more debt and having more of a share in the
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firm’s equity.95 Although the higher debt will mean more risk for the manager, the positive
signal this (and the managers’ ownership in the firm) sends the market allows for cheaper credit
and a higher valuation of the remaining equity. This compensates the manager and alleviates the
concerns from any risk-aversion.
Managers can also overcome the market’s concerns regarding asymmetric information by
using a “pecking order” when financing the firm.96 Many times when managers wish to finance a
project, if they simply attempted to raise the cash by (the board of directors) issuing more equity,
investors may not respond so enthusiastically. Even though the project may have a large
expected payoff, investors will assign some probability that the project truly has a large expected
payoff and some other probability that the project is not as great as the managers claim it is. The
result is that it may be hard for the managers to raise the extra cash, and the project may have to
be foregone. Hence, managers will finance their project first out of retained earnings. If the cash
on hand is insufficient, then debt will be preferred over new equity as this signals to the creditors
that the project is truly worthy and the managers have no fear of default. Finally, equity will be a
last resort if debt and retained earnings are insufficient. Debt, therefore, raises the value of the
firm since the shareholders who do not wish to infuse more equity in the company do not suffer a
dilution in the value of their shares each time the firm decides to finance a new project.
Other reasons for having debt may include the need to signal a commitment to pursuing
an aggressive marketing policy. Firms that wish to signal to their competitors that are serious
about expanding their output (in the hopes that these signals deter the competitors from
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following suit) will take on larger debt levels than a less aggressive firm.97 Debt may also allow
the firm to have a stronger bargaining position with its suppliers or unions.98 This is because the
threat of bankruptcy allows the firm to negotiate more aggressively concessions from the
suppliers (who may lose a valuable client) and unions (who may lose any wage gains in the
bankruptcy proceedings). On the other hand, aggressive debt levels that lead to bankruptcy may
cause concerns among the firm’s customers, especially if the firm’s product is unique, since a
bankrupt firm will not be available to service the product and supply parts and services.99 An
optimal debt level, therefore, can be achieved balancing all the costs and benefits previously
identified.100
The irrelevance of capital structure for firm value maximization can also be derived from
the Fisher Separation theorem.101 The Fisher Separation theorem was introduced by the eminent
economist Irving Fisher in the 1930s,102 and was developed further by Jack Hirshleifer103 and
others in subsequent years. The basic result of the theorem is that production and financial
decisions concerning the firm can be separated. The firm’s managers do not need to inquire into
the financial preferences of the shareholders. All that the manager has to do is invest in those
projects that have the highest net present value (NPV). If the corporation is pictured as a pie, one
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way of expressing the Fisher Separation is to say that the firm’s managers should maximize the
size of the pie, thereby allowing the shareholders the maximum flexibility to decide on how to
spend the earnings from their share of the pie.
The significance of this theorem with respect to the issue at hand is subtle. Consumer’s
preferences regarding savings, consumption, and financial investments are all intertwined.
Shareholders are also consumers. A shareholder who invests capital in a firm is ultimately
interested in how much cash will return in order for the shareholder qua consumer to decide on
how much of the cash to spend on consumption and how much to save. Some shareholders will
have a higher preference for immediate consumption, while others may be more patient. Some
shareholders may be more risk averse and would prefer that the firm invest in safe projects,
while others may be more risk-loving who would rather the firm take more risks. Note that the
risk-loving shareholders may also be the same shareholders who would prefer that the firm’s
managers take on more risky projects when the firm nears insolvency.

Shareholders qua

consumers also care about whether they should consume today versus save for tomorrow. A
firm whose management is able to achieve high rates of return, for example, may induce many of
the shareholders to demand more investments at the expense of current consumption. Such
shareholders may prefer fewer dividends and more investments. They may want the firm to
engage in riskier projects that yield higher rates of return. On the other hand, if the shareholders
are extremely risk-averse, they may not care too much about the high rates of return, and rather
they would care more about a constant stream of dividends. Risk-averse consumers, generally
speaking, are characterized by having a high preference for consumption smoothing. This means
that they prefer to consume at a steady rate over time, and are not swayed by potentially future
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high rates of return to forego present consumption (i.e. more current investment) for future
returns.
The problem this poses for management, therefore, is whose wishes to follow?

If

management were to consult the shareholders, it would find that they consist of a mix ranging
from extremely risk-loving consumers to somewhat risk-averse consumers (who also presumably
hold well-diversified portfolios). Management would have to poll the shareholders on every
project it chooses to undertake with regards to its potential risk and rate of return. Management
may have to consult the shareholders as to whether they wish to have dividends declared or
whether the shareholders would rather see the dividends re-invested. In fact, management may
to have to consult whether the firm should borrow more money; for the extra debt may increase
the risk of the firm’s investments and thereby negatively affect those risk-averse shareholders.
The Fisher Separation theorem, it turns out, states that, in fact, management need not do any of
the above. Rather, all that management has to do is invest in those productive activities that
yield the highest NPV for the firm. The shareholders personal preferences are irrelevant for how
management should conduct itself.
The exact proof of this theorem is beyond the scope of this paper, but a basic outline is
instructive. Suppose the firm is owned by two shareholders, A and B. At any period, the firm
will have some capital on hand Y0. The firm could declare the entire capital as a dividend, invest
the entire amount, or declare some of it as a dividend and invest the rest in a productive project.
We assume that the project lasts one period, so that it yields a return in the second period. In this
simple story, we assume that there is no risk, so that the return on the project is certain. In figure
1, we can see the possibilities that face the firm. The firm can pay out all of Y0 in dividends for
today’s consumption by the shareholders and leave nothing for tomorrow’s consumption. On the
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other hand, it can invest I0 in a project thereby leaving (Y0-I0) for today’s consumption. The
project generates income of Y1 in the next period, which is then available for tomorrow’s
consumption.104 The tradeoff between today and tomorrow’s consumption can be seen on the
figure labeled PPF (production possibilities frontier) in figure 1. If the firm consumes all of Y0,
then tomorrow’s consumption will be zero. For any level less than Y0 consumed, i.e. a positive
investment, the firm will be left with a corresponding amount of return from the project which
allows consumption tomorrow. The slope of the PPF represents the rate of return on the project
invested in. As the amount invested goes up, the project’s rate of return declines. So point 1, for
example, represents a small amount of investment but a high rate of return, while point 2
represent a large amount of investment but a lower rate of return.105
Suppose shareholder consumer A was in charge of the firm. Shareholder A may have a
preference for current consumption, which means that he will want very little invested today but
obviously much less consumption tomorrow. We can denote shareholder A’s preferences by
point a on Figure 1. Shareholder B, on the other hand, may wish to invest more in the project,
and hence consuming less today, which yields more returns tomorrow. This is labeled point b on
Figure 1. If management had to reconcile these two views, it may have a difficult task on hand.
What saves management, however, from the conundrum is the fact that the shareholders are not
exclusively dependant on the firm’s investment project for their wealth. The shareholders also
have the ability to access the market for loans to finance their consumption/investment decisions.
In fact, since there is no uncertainty in this model, the firm must invest so that the rate of return
is equal to the risk-free interest rate. If the firm’s project yielded less than that, the shareholders
would simply lend all their money in the loan market. If the firm’s project yielded more than the
104
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interest rate, the shareholders would want the firm to invest more in the project, which would
mean that the rate of return will ultimately fall down back to equal the interest rate. Hence the
amount the firm invests will be such that the project’s rate of return equals the interest rate. But
this is equivalent to saying the firm picks a project with the maximum NPV. The project’s NPV
is

(Y0

I0 ) +

Y1
, where r is the risk-free rate, which can be shown mathematically
(1 + r )

maximized when the firm chooses a project whose rate of return is r.106 This point is represented
on Figure 1, as point Y*, which is where the line -(1+ r) is tangent to the PPF.
This line also represents the financial value of the investment project. Any shareholder
can now borrow against next period’s return for consumption in this period. The shareholders
can access the market for loans are able to follow their personal preferences without imposing
their will on management. Shareholder A borrows money against the fact that the firm will have
Y* tomorrow, and hence will be able to consume at point a’ on Figure 1. Notice that the
shareholder is now able to consume even more today than in the previous scenario where he
could only consume at point a. In fact, shareholder A is consuming more than the firm’s
available initial capital Y0. Shareholder B, on the other hand, can now lend more money to firm
at an interest rate r, which allows it to reap a higher level of consumption tomorrow than if the
firm were managed according to the previous scenario. Shareholder B’s consumption is at point
b’, which is higher than point b. This means that he consumes even less today but more
tomorrow. Shareholder B is essentially a creditor, while shareholder A is a shareholder who is
able to finance his lack of investment in the firm using his shares as collateral.
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The Fisher separation theorem conveys two results: 1) The management decision on what
to invest in is driven by choosing the maximum NPV project and not the shareholders’ (or,
similarly, creditors’) preferences; and 2) The method of financing the firm is also irrelevant.
The results are the same when there is uncertainty in the model as concerns the ex post
value of projects. Now the firm simply picks the project that yields the maximum expected
NPV, and the expected rate of return of the project is set to be equal to the risk-free rate of
return.107
5.

The Effects of Firm Value Maximization on Shareholders’ and Creditors’ Claims

In the previous section we used the MM theorem and the Fisher Separation to
demonstrate that maximizing the value of the firm by selecting the highest NPV projects does
not require directors to investigate the particular expectations or incentives of shareholders and
creditors. In this section we will show that the effect of firm value maximization complies with
stakeholders’ claims towards the corporation. Firstly we will demonstrate that maximizing the
value of the firm is functionally equivalent with maximizing shareholder value. Subsequently,
we will examine the customary provisions of bond covenants, in order to demonstrate that the
firm value maximization objective ensures the firm’s compliance with the specific restrictions
imposed by the bond agreements to protect the creditors. Moreover, bond covenants increase the
value of the firm by reducing the costs associated with the conflicts between shareholders and
creditors. This additional increase in the value of the firm benefits both shareholders and
creditors, as we demonstrate here under.
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39

A. The Equivalence between the Firm Value Maximization and the Shareholder Value
Maximization
Using some basic concepts from finance, we will demonstrate that maximizing the value
of the firm is functionally equivalent with maximizing shareholder value.108 Imagine that an
entrepreneur has just incorporated a firm and he needs to raise an amount of capital, say $100
million, using either equity or debt. Suppose the entrepreneur gets one share regardless of what
method he uses, which denotes some residual ownership. Now, he can raise the entire amount
using only equity, only debt, or some mix of the two. Let us suppose at this stage that there are
no tax (or other) advantages or disadvantages (such as bankruptcy costs) to issuing debt.
Assume that the firm will exist for only time period during which it will engage in some
productive activity. The activity will yield some revenue in the next time period. The revenue
could be either high or low with some probability objectively known beforehand. Let us assume
that the revenues could either be zero with probability 10% or $120 million with a 90%
probability. Finally assume the risk-free interest rate is (for the sake of simplicity) 0%.
Now suppose the firm finances itself using only equity. This means that it will raise $100
million from the shareholders, and in the next period their expected revenues are $108 million.109
The value of the firm here is equal to the value of the shares which is namely $108 million.
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If, the firm borrows the entire amount and if there were no risk of the firm’s project
yielding a low return (namely $0), then the creditors would charge the risk-free interest rate of
0%, and hence the firm would have to pay $100 million in the next period. But now since there
is a 10% chance of insolvency, the creditors will want to adjust the interest rate they charge so
that the rate is adjusted so that the expected interest rate is equal to the risk-free rate. In other
words, the creditors will want a payment of k interest rate, so that 0.1 x $0 + 0.9 x ($100
million)x(1+k) = $100 million x (1+0.0).

The calculation yield a risk-adjusted rate of k

=11.11%. Hence, the creditor will now receive in the event of solvency $111.11 million (leaving
$8.89 million for the entrepreneur), and $0 in the event of insolvency, which is an expected
payment of $100 million. The value of the equity is 0.1 x $0 + 0.9 x $8.89 = $8 million. The
value of the firm now is equal to the value of the debt plus the value of the one share, which is
equal to $100 + $8 = $108 million. This is the exact same value of the firm when the firm used
all equity for financing.
Varying the amount of the debt that is used will always yield the same result: no matter
what debt equity ratio is employed the firm will always have the same value. This is a very
simplified version of the MM theorem. The issue, now, becomes whether shareholder value
maximization is equivalent to firm value maximization. Suppose now, the entrepreneur was
faced with two projects that had the same expected value, but one of which was riskier than the
other. The first project, for example, is the project just discussed, while the second project is one
where there is a 28% chance of an outcome of $0 and a 72% chance of an outcome of $150
million. The expected value of the project is still $108 million, but now there is higher chance of
the $0 outcome, but a higher payoff in the event of a non-zero outcome.
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In the second example, if the firm was financed entirely by equity, then the value of the
shares and the firm will also be $108 million. If the project is financed exclusively by debt, then
the creditor will want to charge an interest rate that will compensate for the extra risk. The new
risk-adjusted rate k’ will be set so that 0.28 x $0 + 0.72 x ($100 million)x(1+k’) = $100 million,
or k’ = 38.89%. The creditor will receive in the event of solvency $138.89 million (leaving
$11.11 million for the entrepreneur), and $0 in the event of insolvency, which amounts to an
expected payment of $100 million. The value of the equity is 0.28 x $0 + 0.72 x $11.11 = $8
million. The value of the firm now is equal to the value of the debt plus the value of the one
share, which is equal to $100 + $8 = $108 million. In addition to this being the same value of the
firm when the firm used all equity for financing, it is also the exact same value of the firm when
the less risky project was chosen.
The value of equity is also invariant to the amount of debt used and the risky nature of
project picked by the entrepreneur. This can be generalized to the statement that the value of
equity = value of the firm (or the expected value of the project) – the risk-free interest plus
principal on the debt.110 In other words, the value of equity is also invariant to the nature of risky
project. The reason is obvious and has already been alluded to by many commentators: creditors
can adjust the interest rate they charge in response to the risk associated with the projects that
management and the board of directors undertake.
Ah but – the refrain goes – what if, after borrowing the money for project one (the less
risky project) the shareholder-entrepreneur decides to undertake the second project? Suppose the
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firm is financed exclusively by debt, then the shareholder pays only a rate of 11.11%, while the
project yields either $0 or $150 leaving the shareholder $38.89 million. This increases the value
of equity to $28 million, but decreases the value of debt to 0.28 x $0 + 0.72 x $111.11 million =
$80 million. The total value of the firm is still equal to $108 million, but the value of equity is
now increased at the expense of debt. If directors owed fiduciary duties to creditors (ever or in
the vicinity of insolvency), this example would be one where those duties were breached. This
example is analogous to Chancellor Allen’s example from Credit Lyonnais111.
There are two problems with this model of shareholder behavior. The first is that it is not
an equilibrium in the economic sense, and more specifically it is not a rational expectations
equilibrium.112 Rational expectations is an economic modeling concept that is used most often in
the macroeconomics literature, but also in game theoretic settings. It can basically be summed
up (especially in the context of our example) as follows: Given that those specifying the model
(such as ourselves, Chancellor Allen etc.) of the entrepreneur’s behavior anticipated that he
would choose the riskier project after representing to the creditor that the first project would be
chosen, the creditor would also anticipate this behavior. To say that the entrepreneur could fool
the creditor would not be rational, and furthermore, any model that specifies such a model of
behavior does not describe an economic equilibrium. Hence, the creditor will automatically
assume that the shareholder will choose the riskier project and adjust the interest rate to be 39%,
forcing the entrepreneur always to choose the riskier project.113
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The second problem is that, from the prospect of shareholders’ interest, the best thing is
not to invest in a risky project at all; rather, the best and safest course of action would be to
finance exclusively with debt, declare the cash from the debt as a one-time dividend, and then
declare bankruptcy leaving the creditor with no return. Again, a creditor would anticipate this
behavior would then not lend any money at all, thereby breaking down the corporate credit
market. For this reason, creditors have developed a set of contracts that prevent debtors from
engaging in risky or fraudulent activities at creditors’ expense, and that allow the shareholders to
have access to credit capital.
An entrepreneur who genuinely wished to only undertake the less risky project, therefore,
would have to design a debt contract in such a way whereby he credibly committed that only the
less risky project would be undertaken. Similarly the creditor could finance the less risky project
at the lower interest rate, by designing the debt contract so that the entrepreneur would only
choose the less risky project. Such contracts may specify a huge penalty for choosing the riskier
project. They may also require the maintenance of certain financial ratios or even specify the
nature of projects undertaken. This ability by creditors to specify restrictions on the firm’s
behavior is the reason why the commentators have resisted adding fiduciary duties to creditors as
another layer of protection.

B. The Firm Value Maximization Goal and the Compliance with the Debt Covenants
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Debt covenants have existed for hundreds of years.114 It would seem odd, therefore, to
suddenly discover that shareholders might try to oppress creditors when, in fact by now, creditors
should have probably learnt best how to protect themselves. In a seminal article examining the
subject of covenants, Smith and Warner showed that debt contracts solve the bondholdershareholder conflict, by providing specific covenants that give shareholders the incentives to
follow a strategy that maximizes the value of the firm.115 The conflict between bondholders and
shareholders occurs in firms that have issued risky bonds.116 In such firms, the management,
acting in the shareholders’ interest, may have an incentive to design the firm’s operating strategy
and financial structure so as to benefit the shareholders at the bondholder’s expense.117 The main
sources of this conflict are: dividend payment,118 claim dilution,119 asset substitution,120 and the
incentive for underinvestment.121
Rational bondholders anticipate shareholders’ incentives, and, therefore, include
restrictive covenants in the bond indentures. Although restrictive covenants involve costs, they
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can increase the value of the firm by reducing the opportunity loss caused by stockholders’
incentive to pursue projects which do not maximize the value of the firm.122
Smith and Warner looked at covenants and classified them into four broad categories: 1)
production/investment covenants, 2) dividend covenants, 3) financing covenants, and 4) bonding
covenants.123 By using one or more of the four covenants, even if not all are used, bondholders
can effectively control shareholder and managerial opportunism.124 These covenants usually
have acceleration clauses that state that the debt payments can be accelerated upon the
occurrence of certain events or a violation of the terms of the covenant.
The production/investment covenants usually specify restrictions on the firm’s
purchasing of other financial assets, the firm’s disposition of assets, or restrictions on the firm’s
merger activities.125 The restrictions on the purchase of other financial assets is seen as an
attempt to prevent asset substitution, i.e. the transformation of the cash raised by debt into
another asset thereby leaving the creditor at the mercy of new asset’s uncertain value. Similarly,
the restriction on the firm’s disposition of assets protects the creditor against an opportunistic
sale of collateral (if the debt is secured) or potential assets to seize in the event of insolvency (if
the debt is unsecured). The restriction on merger activities achieves the same goals as the
prohibition on asset disposition; mergers usually open up the potential for mixing of secure or
liquid assets with other assets making the creditors’ job of finding his security much harder than
before the merger. Other covenants in this category can also require the maintenance of certain
assets or restrict what can be done with them. All of these restrictions are imposed with an eye
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to protecting the firm’s assets from waste or opportunistic liquidation. The effect of all of these
restrictions is to keep the firm from liquidating assets and declaring them as dividends, or the
prevention of undertaking risky projects that will put the assets at risk.
The dividend covenants restrict payments of dividends,126 by defining an inventory of
funds available for dividend payments over the life of the bonds.127 These covenants do not
restrict payment of dividends per se, but the distribution of dividends financed by issuing debt or
by sale of the firm’s existing assets (either of which would reduce the value of the debt).128 The
dividend restrictions are typically related to the borrower’s profitability.129 Bank loans usually
comprise more refined dividend covenants, specifying the maximum value of dividends for
given periods, limiting the frequency of dividend payments or conditioning the payments on
various tests, such as credit ratings or financial ratios.130 Creditors also use dividend covenants
to address indirectly shareholders’ underinvestment incentives.131 In financially distressed firms,
shareholders have the incentives to forego the projects the benefits of which accrue entirely to
creditors.132 If the project yields no net gains to shareholders, form their point of view such
investment is worthless. Underinvestment is prejudicial for creditors, because of the heightened
default risk and, to the extent that no other firm can pursue the project, society as a whole looses
as well.133 A covenant blocking dividend payments addresses this problem indirectly, by forcing
the firm to reinvest its free liquid assets or, if there are no profitable projects available, to repay
126
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the loan’s principal amount.134 The dividend covenants have some disadvantages. An outright
prohibition or a tight restriction on dividends increases the firm’s incentives to engage in asset
substitution and claim dilution.135 Furthermore, when the firm is doing poorly, the dividend
constraint is not capable to control indirectly the investment/financing policy.136
The bond covenants restricting subsequent financing policy impose on the firm
limitations on debt137 and restrictions regarding rentals, lease and sale-leasebacks.138 The
financing covenants increase the coverage on the debt and reduce the firm’s default risk.
Moreover, the limitations on debt decrease the costs associated with the stockholder-bondholder
conflict of interests, by establishing an optimal level of debt.139 A prohibition on all debt issues,
however, would reduce the value of the firm, because the corporation would be able to engage
only in a limited number of positive net present value projects.140 In addition to the restrictions
on debt, creditors protect themselves against claim dilution by covenants restricting mortgages
and liens.141 These covenants can impose a direct and sweeping prohibition on prior claims or
can ban the creation of a lien or mortgage unless these also secure the debt benefited by the
provision.142 While the direct prohibition is more likely to be used in private placements or bank
term loans,143 the latter approach is specific for public bond issues.144
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The debt contract can also include covenants specifying bonding activities by the firm.145
The costs estimated by bondholders with monitoring the firm’s policy influence the price of the
bonds and the value of the firm at the time of bond issuance.146 Therefore, the inclusion in the
bond indentures of covenants that lower the costs of monitoring equally serves the interests of
shareholders and bondholders.147 The bonding covenants increase the market value of the firm by
reducing the agency costs between bondholders and stockholders, as well as between managers
and stockholders.148
The efficiency of bond covenants is ensured by the default remedies available to
bondholders. In case of default, bondholders can seize the collateral, trigger the acceleration of
debt maturity or commence bankruptcy proceedings.149 But, since such actions are costly, the
debt contract is usually renegotiated to eliminate the default.150
The bond covenants increase the value of the firm by reducing the costs associated with
the conflict of interests between stockholders and bondholders. Such costs are reduced by
decreasing the agency costs associated with risky debt, as well as by establishing an optimal
amount of debt that reduces the benefits of wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders.
The benefits of bond covenants, however, are impaired by the direct and opportunity costs of
complying with the contractual restrictions.
144
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Recently, another comprehensive study of covenants was conducted examining the
relationship between covenants’ and firms’ financial goals.151 The authors investigated the use
of covenants by firms by looking at over 15,000 debt issues between 1960 and 2003. They found
that lower priority, lower rated, and shorter maturity debt had more covenant protections. Such
debt, no doubt, is the most vulnerable when compared to higher priority and higher rated debt.
They found that debt issued by regulated firms (and hence whose investment activities are
limited in scope) have less covenant protections. Firms with more leverage and more growth
opportunities (and hence the potential for riskier investment projects) had more covenant
protections, but firms with growth opportunities that had covenant protections had higher debt
levels. In other words, because of the covenant protections, creditors were willing to lend more
to firms that had high payoff (but high risk) investment opportunities if they felt protected. This,
of course, is good news for shareholders who can see higher value to their shares from the higher
growth opportunities. Where firms did not use long-term debt laden with covenants, they used
short-term debt that acted as a substitute for covenant protected long-term debt. Hence, firms
with higher growth opportunities were also found to use more short-term debt. They also found
that if the debt is convertible, there are less covenant restrictions. The convertibility allows the
creditors to stave off the potential conflict with the shareholders by converting the debt to shares
if the high payoffs are realized.
In this section we have analyzed the effects on shareholders and creditors of a fiduciary
duty imposing the obligation to maximize the value of the firm. We have demonstrated that
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maximizing the value of the firm responds to the expectations that shareholders and creditors
have towards the firm.152

152

The same conclusion can be reached by applying the hypothetical bargain theory to fiduciary duties and by
analyzing the structure of the firm’s capital using the portfolio theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(“CAPM”).
The result of the hypothetical bargain between the directors, on one hand, and shareholders or creditors on
the other illustrates what would the parties have agreed to, had they been able to contract regarding the purpose of
fiduciary duties. Why is the hypothetical bargain setting necessary? To answer this question, we shall appeal to the
Coase theorem. Coase demonstrated that, in a world of zero transaction costs, private bargaining is the best means to
allocate the resources efficiently. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. ECON. 1 (1960). See also
Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 82 (2nd ed. 1997). When transaction costs, however, are high
enough to prevent private bargaining, the law should ensure the efficient use of resources by assigning the property
rights. Id.
In the case of fiduciary duties, the increased transaction costs preclude the parties to conclude a complete
contract that would address every contingency that may occur and every action that may be feasible in any possible
situation. Stated differently, the high transaction costs and the bounded rationality of the parties cause the contracts
between the firm and stakeholders to be incomplete. Therefore, according to the Coaseian theorems, the law must
fill in the contractual gaps generated by high transaction costs.
The purpose of the hypothetical bargain setting is to demonstrate that corporate constituencies would not
choose stakeholder wealth maximization as the gap-filling rule, even when the corporation is on the verge of
financial distress, since the only acceptable option in terms of economic efficiency is the maximization of firm’s
value.
Shareholders are residual claimants. One of the outcomes of this status is the fact that their claims on the
firm’s cash flow are variable (as opposed to creditors, who have a fixed claim). Consequently, from the
shareholders’ viewpoint, maximizing their residual claims would be the bargained-for purpose of directors’
fiduciary duties. In theory, this goal would give directors two options for performing their duties: to maximize the
value of the firm or to maximize residual claims at the expense of creditors. At a deeper analysis, however, it is easy
to observe that only the first option meets the maximization requirement. If directors sacrifice creditors’ interests to
increase the return on equity, it would be only a matter of time until the firm would face the impossibility of
financing its business through debt. No debt investor would agree to finance the company, or the cost of debt would
increase significantly, to the point where it would become unfeasible. Nevertheless, if directors managed to borrow
more debt and to increase shareholders’ wealth while disregarding creditors’ rights, the bankruptcy risks would
grow exponentially, and the firm would soon go bankrupt. Consequently, the effective outcome of scarifying
creditors’ interests is setting a narrow time-horizon for shareholders’ claims, which is the opposite effect of
maximization. By contrast, maximizing the value of the firm results in maximizing shareholders’ claims, while
avoiding the aforementioned inconveniences. This option ensures effective maximization of equity claims, since
there are no obvious limits value-wise or time-wise for the returns on equity. Therefore, the only economic-efficient
option for shareholders is to bargain for directors’ obligation to maximize the value of the firm.
Creditors, as opposed to shareholders, have fixed claims against firm’s cash flows. It follows that creditors
could bargain ex ante for two obligations incumbent on managers: to preserve the value of their claims and to
alleviate the enforcement thereof. If we picture the corporation as a pie divided between shareholders and creditors,
we can observe that there is only one practical way to achieve both objectives envisaged by creditors: by increasing
the size of the pie. Maximizing the pie without affecting the value of debt claims effectively means reducing the
percentage of creditors’ slice relative to the whole pie, while preserving its face value. Thereby, the enforcement of
creditors’ receivables becomes less burdening.
The same conclusion regarding the outcome of the hypothetical bargain between the firm and financial
investors can be reached by appealing to the portfolio theory.
The finance literature distinguishes between two types of risk associated with an investment: the systematic
risk and the unsystematic risk. The systematic risk is caused by market factors that affect all firms, such as war,
inflation, political events, etc. Gitman, supra note 44 at 322. The unsystematic risk is caused by firm-specific,
random events, such as lawsuits, strikes, loss of a key account, etc. Id.. The relevance of the distinction resides in the
possibility of risk elimination through diversification. The unsystematic risk can be eliminated by spreading the
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6.

Conclusion

Instead of joining the doctrinal debate over the purpose of fiduciary duties, we have
demonstrated that there is a valid model that reconciles the supposedly contradictory currents of
thought from this field.
Our model builds on the essence of two important North-American court decisions
regarding the fiduciary duties: Credit Lyonnais and Peoples Department Stores. Although both
court decisions emphasized directors’ obligation to maximize the value of the firm, they did not
address several concepts that are vital for an accurate understanding of the fiduciary duty model
they advocate: the concept of firm’s value and the legal means the directors can use in order to
maximize this value. Arguably, such an analysis would have exceeded the competence of the
courts, due to their lack of business expertise. Given their incompleteness and their ambiguity,
these court decisions have generated a wave of criticism from the legal scholars.
This paper provides a legally and economically valid model that answers many of the
queries related to the aforementioned court rulings. Our model is built around one main insight:
the positive net present value projects align the best interests of the corporation, regarded as a
separate legal entity, with the economic interests of shareholders and creditors.

investment across many assets (diversifiable risk). The systematic risk affects almost all assets to some degree, and,
therefore, cannot be eliminated by diversification (non-diversifiable risk). Ross et al, supra note 52 at 408.
According to the portfolio theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”), rational investors will
diversify away the specific risk associated with their investment (the unsystematic risk), by buying a variety of
different capital assets, including both corporate stocks and bonds. The specific risks associated with each of the
various securities composing a portfolio will cancel each other out, leaving the portfolio owner better off as
compared to holding only one type of securities. The CAPM assumes that the rational investor would optimize his
portfolio, up to the point where it displays the lowest possible risk for its level of return.
Rational diversified investors would not agree ex ante to the maximization of the value of their shares if that meant
reducing the value of their bonds (or other capital assets) with more than the increase in the share value. For these
reasons, rational investors would not choose shareholder wealth maximization or other asset value maximization as
gap-filling rule. Instead they would bargain ex ante for the maximization of firm’s value, which would increase the
value of the variety of capital assets composing their portfolio.
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Our analysis started by addressing one fundamental question: how is the value of a firm
gauged? In order to articulate the answer, we appealed to the corporate finance literature. We
observed that the value of a firm is given by its ability to generate cash. Creditors and
shareholders tend to focus on the firm’s cash flow streams, since the return on their investments
(i.e. interests, dividends) are inexorably cash-linked.
Furthermore, we showed that directors’ obligation to maximize the value of the firm can
be construed as the obligation to select the projects that generate the highest discounted value of
future cash flow streams (the projects that have the highest expected net present value).
This understanding of fiduciary duties accommodates the interests of the corporation with
those of its constituencies. We have demonstrated this by using two corporate finance concepts:
the MM theorem and the Fisher Separation. Both these theories show that, beyond an optimum
level of debt, managers’ decisions regarding the maximization of firm’s value are independent of
the specific interests of creditors and shareholders. In terms of fiduciary duties, this shows that
the firm value maximization goal requires directors to pursue the best interests of the
corporation, without investigating the stakeholders’ particular expectations.
By employing several fundamental concepts of corporate finance, this paper substantiates
the purpose of directors’ fiduciary duties, with a view to consolidate the feeble framework drawn
by recent North-American court decisions.
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The separation between shareholders’ consumption preferences and managers’ investment decisions

54

